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Hawk-Dove is an interesting and important game of evolutionary
biology. We consider the game from point of view of evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESSs). In the classical version of the game only a mixed ESS
exists.We find a quantum version of this game where both pure and mixed
ESSs can exist.
1 Introduction
The idea of ESS was originally given by Maynard Smith and Price [1] with the
central idea of uninvadability against mutants i.e. a population playing an ESS
can withstand a small invading group. If a strategy A is played by almost all
members of a population and rest of the population forms a small group of
mutants playing strategy B constituting a fraction ε of total population. The
strategy A is said to be ESS against B if $[A, (1−)A+B] > $[B, (1−)A+B]
where $(A,B) is payo to player playing A against player playing B. For all
suciently small positive  there exists an 0 such that for all  2 [0, 0] the
above inequality is satised [2] If for the given A and B the 0 is as large as
possible the 0 is called invasion barrier. If B comes at a frequency larger than
0 it will lead to an invasion.
For symmetric bi-matrix game A is an ESS with respect to B [3, 2].if
$(A,A) > $(B,A) and if $(A,A) = $(B,A) then $(A,B) > $(B,B). For asym-
metric case NE with strict inequality must hold in case it is an ESS. For example
a strategy pair (A, B) is an ESS if $(A, B) > $(A,B) for all A 6= A and
$B(A, B) > $B(A, B) for all B 6= B.
Iqbal and Toor [4, 5] considered ESSs in quantum versions of Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Battle of Sexes games. They showed that evolutionary stability
of Nash equilibria in symmetric as well as asymmetric games can be controlled by
changing parameters of an initial quantum state like jψini = a jS1S1i+ b jS2S2i
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where S1, S2 represent pure strategies. Because a transition between a classical
and a quantum form of these games also occurs by changing those parameters,
therefore, it becomes possible that a Nash equilibrium not ESS in classical game
can be an ESS in certain quantum form of the same game.
We take Hawk-Dove game in which neither Hawk nor the Dove is a pure
ESS. i.e. there is no pure ESS, however, there exists a mixed ESS. When the
game is quantized we nd that the game remains symmetric if an additional
restriction is imposed on initial state parameters. It leads to two cases of the
game: symmetric and asymmetric. We discuss both these cases and show that
there exist pure ESSs in both but mixed ESS can exist in symmetric case only.
1.1 Classical Hawk-Dove Game
Hawk-Dove [7] is a simple game where two behavioral strategies employ very
dierent means to obtain the resources. Hawks are very aggressive and always
ght for some resource. These ghts are very brutal aairs with the loser being
the one who rst sustains the injury. The winner takes the sole possession of
the resource. The Hawks who lose are only injured, mathematics of the game
requires that they do not die and are fully mended before their next expected
contest. In a Hawk-Hawk contest each has a chance of 50% winning.
Dove never ghts for a resource. It displays and if attacked it immediately
withdraws before getting injured. Thus it will always lose a conflict with a
Hawk, but it is not hurt when confronts a Hawk, hence these interactions are
neutral with respect to Doves tness. Dove do not display for a long against a
Hawk. In a contest when it knows that the opponent is the Hawk it withdraws
without paying a meaningful cost. On the other hand if a Dove meets a Dove
there will be period of displaying with some cost (time, energy for display) but
no injury. It is assumed that doves are equally good in displaying and they
adopt strategy of waiting for random time thus when a Dove meets another
Dove each has 50% chance of winning. The winner is the individual willing to
pay more [7].
To analyze the game quantitatively let v be the value of resource, a positive
number; injury to self is i, a negative number; losing a resource costs 0 and cost
of display is d, a negative number. The payo matrix takes the form
(1)
Hawk(H) Dove(D)
Hawk(H) (v2 + i2, v2 + i2) (v, 0)
Dove(D) (0, v) (v2 + d, v2 + d)
From the payo matrix (1.1) it is clear that Hawk is a pure ESS if either
$(H,H) > $(D,H) or $(H,H) = $(D,H) and $(H,D) > $(D,D). In these con-
ditions we see from payo matrix (1.1) that if $(H,H) > $(D,H) then (v+ i) >
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0. The second condition implies v + i = 0 and v2 > d. As v2 > d al-
ways holds therefore Hawk is pure ESS whenever v + i  0. Since v2 > d
so $(H,D) > $(D,D) and Dove can never be pure ESS[7]. Selecting the values
as [7]
Value of resource v = 50
Injury to self i = −100
Cost of display d = −10
Resource cost c = 0 (2)
and the payo matrix (1.1) takes the form
(3)
H D
H (−25,−25) (50, 0)
D (0, 50) (15, 15)
It is clear that there is no pure ESS in this game [7].
1.1.1 Mixed ESS
For pure strategies H and D the corresponding tnesses W (H), W (D) are
dened as [7]
W (H) = $(H,H)h+ $(H,D)(1− h)
W (D) = $(D,H)h+ $(D,D)(1− h) (4)
where h is the classical frequency of the pure strategy H . For a mixed ESS
both strategies must have same tness i.e. W (H) = W (D). At such a mixed
equilibrium we have [7]
h1− h = $(D,D)− $(H,D)$(H,H)− $(D,H)
and h = 2d− v2d+ i (5)
Using values from the payo matrix (1.1) the frequencies of Hawks and Doves
are h = .583 and 1− h = .417 respectively.
2 Quantum Hawk-Dove Game
We use Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [9] to quantize this game assuming that
two players, call them Alice and Bob, can play pure strategies H and D. The
players have the following entangled state at their disposal
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jψini = a jHHi+ b jDDi+ c jHDi+ d jDHi
where jaj2 + jbj2 + jcj2 + jdj2 = 1 (6)
where rst position is reserved for Alice’s strategy and the second for Bob’s.
The associated density matrix takes the form
ρin = jaj2 jHHi hHH j+ ab jHHi hDDj+ ac jHHi hHDj+ ad jHHi hDH j
+ba jDDi hHH j+ jbj2 jDDi hDDj+ bc jDDi hHDj+ bd jDDi hDH j
+ca jHDi hHH j+ cb jHDi hDDj+ jcj2 jHDi hHDj+ cd jHDi hDH j
+da jDHi hHH j+ db jDHi hDDj+ dc jDHi hHDj+ jdj2 jDHi hDH j
Let C be a unitary and Hermitian operator such that
C jHi = jDi , C jDi = jHi , C = Cy = C−1 (7)
If Alice uses I, the identity operator, with probability p and C with probability
(1− p) and Bob uses these operators with probability q and (1− q) respectively
then nal density matrix takes the form [9].
ρf = pqIA ⊗ IBρinIyA ⊗ IyB + p(1− q)IA ⊗ CBρinIyA ⊗ CyB
+q(1− p)CA ⊗ IBρinCyA ⊗ IyB + (1 − p)(1− q)CA ⊗ CBρinCyA ⊗ CyB
The payo operators for Alice and Bob are dened as [9]
PA = (v2 + i2) jHHi hHH j+ v jHDi hHDj+ (v2 + d) jDDi hDDj (8)
PB = (v2 + i2) jHHi hHH j+ v jDHi hDH j+ (v2 + d) jDDi hDDj (9)
The payo functions are obtained as mean values of these operators i.e.
$A(p, q) = Tr(PAρf ) $B(p, q) = Tr(PBρf ) (10)
From relations (2) and (2) we obtain expression for the nal density matrix
which depends on parameters p, q, a, b, c, d. The expected payo functions for
both the players are obtained from eqs. (10)
$A(p, q) = (v2 + i2)[pq jaj2 + p(1− q) jcj2 + q(1− p) jdj2 + (1− p)(1 − q) jbj2]
+v[pq jcj2 + p(1− q) jaj2 + q(1 − p) jbj2 + (1− p)(1 − q) jdj2]
+(v2 + d)[pq jbj2 + p(1− q) jdj2 + q(1 − p) jcj2 + (1 − p)(1− q) jaj2
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$B(p, q) = (v2 + i2)[pq jaj2 + p(1− q) jcj2 + q(1 − p) jdj2 + (1− p)(1− q) jbj2]
+v[pq jdj2 + p(1− q) jbj2 + q(1− p) jaj2 + (1− p)(1− q) jcj2
+(v2 + d)[pq jbj2 + p(1− q) jdj2 + q(1− p) jcj2 + (1− p)(1− q) jaj2]
with values from matrix (1.1) eq. (2) becomes
$A(p, q) = p[qf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 60 jcj2 + 60 jdj2g
−25 jcj2 + 25 jbj2 + 35 jaj2 − 35 jdj2]
+q[75 jbj2 − 75 jdj2 − 15 jaj2 + 15 jcj2]− 25 jbj2 + 50 jdj2 + 15 jaj2
$B(p, q) = q[pf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 60 jcj2 + 60 jdj2g
−25 jdj2 + 25 jbj2 + 35 jaj2 − 35 jcj2]
+p[75 jbj2 − 75 jcj2 + 15 jdj2 − 15 jaj2]− 25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 + 15 jaj2
In a symmetric game an interchange of p and q changes $A(p, q) into $B(p, q).
For the general quantum state jψini (??) it is clear from eq. (2) that an ad-
ditional restriction of c = d on the initial state parameters is required to get a
symmetric quantum game. We will discuss both these cases.
2.1 Symmetric case (c=d)
In a symmetric game G = (M,MT ),where M is a square matrix and T is for
transpose, an ESS is a symmetric NE with an additional \stability property"
[7]. From eq. (2) the game becomes symmetric when c = d, and the payo
functions take the form
$A(p, q) = p[qf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 120 jcj2g+ 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 60 jcj2]
+q[−15 jaj2 + 75 jbj2 − 60 jcj2] + 15 jaj2 − 25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2
$B(p, q) = q[pf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 120 jcj2g+ 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 60 jcj2]
+p[−15 jaj2 + 75 jbj2 − 60 jcj2] + 15 jaj2 − 25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 (11)
Since the game is symmetric, a game where players are anonymous, therefore
the subscripts A and B are not necessary so $A(p, q) = $B(p, q) = $(p, q). The
NE inequality becomes
$(p, q)− $(p, q)  0
) (p − p)[qf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 120 jcj2g+ 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 60 jcj2]  0
Three Nash equilibria arise from this inequality.
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2.1.1 Case 1 ( p = q = 0)
The inequality (2.1) requires 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 60 jcj2 < 0. This holds, for
example, for jaj2 = 116, jbj2 = 14, jcj2 = 1116. Therefore from eqs. (11)
$(0, 0) = 15 jaj2 − 25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 = 46516
$(p, 0) = (35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 60 jcj2)p+ 15 jaj2 − 25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2
= 46516− 52516p (12)
So that $(0, 0) > $(p, 0) 8 0 < p < 1. Hence p = q = 0 is an ESS.
2.1.2 Case 2 (p = q = 1)
In this case eq. (2.1) demands −25 jaj2 − 35 jbj2 + 60 jcj2 > 0. This inequality
holds, for example, for jaj2 = 116, jbj2 = 18, jcj2 = 1316. From eqs. (11)
$(1, 1) = −25 jaj2 + 15 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 = 65516
$(p, 1) = (−25 jaj2 − 35 jbj2 + 60 jcj2)p+ 50 jbj2 − 10 jcj2
= −158 + 68516p. (13)
Since $(1, 1)− $(p, 1) = 68516(1− p) > 0 8 0 < p < 1, therefore, p = q = 1 is
an ESS.
2.1.3 Case 3 (mixed ESS)
From inequality (2.1) the mixed NE is p = q = −7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 12 jcj2 12(− jaj2 − jbj2 + 2 jcj2).
For classical game, (jaj2 = 1), we get p = q = 712. In quantum version of the
game we can obtain this value, for example, for jaj2 = 12, jbj2 = jcj2 = 16. The










Now from eq. (11) $(p, q) = $(p, q) = 8.75, $(q, q) = −60q2 + 20q + 353,
$(p, q) = −600q + 66536 and $(p, q) − $(q, q) = 720q2 − 820q + 24536 > 0
8 0 < q < 1. It implies that $(p, q) > $(q, q). Therefore p = q =
−7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 12 jcj2 12(− jaj2 − jbj2 + 2 jcj2) is a mixed ESS for the above
values of initial quantum state parameters.
2.2 Asymmetric case (c6=d)
For asymmetric bi-matrix game G = (M,N), where M and N are square ma-
trices and N 6= MT an ESS is dened with strict Nash inequality [10].In this
case a strategy pair (A, B) is an ESS if NE conditions with strict inequalities
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hold i.e. $A(A, B) > $A(A,B) for all A 6= A and $B(A, B) > $B(A, B)
for all B 6= B.Nash inequalities from (2) are then
$A(p, q)− $A(p, q)  0
) (p − p)[qf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 60 jcj2 + 60 jdj2g+ 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2
−25 jcj2 − 35 jdj2]  0
$B(p, q)− $A(p, q)  0
) (q − q)[pf−60 jaj2 − 60 jbj2 + 60 jcj2 + 60 jdj2g+ 35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2
−35 jcj2 − 25 jdj2]  0
From these inequalities three Nash equilibria arise
2.2.1 Case 1 (p = q = 0)
From inequalities (2.2), (2.2) and for p = q = 0 we get
35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 25 jcj2 − 35 jdj2 < 0 (15)
35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 35 jcj2 − 25 jdj2 < 0 (16)
respectively. Both these inequalities (15) and (16) are satised, for example, for
jaj2 = 116, jbj2 = 14, jcj2 = 916, jdj2 = 18. Therefore from eq. (2)
$A(0, 0) = 15 jaj2 − 25 jbj2 + 50 jdj2 = 1516
$A(p, 0) = 1516 + p(35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 25 jcj2 − 35 jdj2)
= 1516− 10p (17)
$B(0, 0) = −25 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 + 15 jaj2 = 36516
$B(0, q) = 36516 + q(35 jaj2 + 25 jbj2 − 35 jcj2 − 25 jdj2)
= 36516− 23016q (18)
Since $A(0, 0) > $A(p, 0) 8 0 < p < 1. and $B(0, 0) > $B(0, q) 8 0 < q < 1.
Therefore strict inequality holds and p = q = 0 is an ESS.
2.2.2 Case 2 (p = q = 1)
Similarly from inequalities (2.2), (2.2) and for p = q = 1 we get.
−25 jaj2 − 35 jbj2 + 35 jcj2 + 25 jdj2 > 0 (19)
−25 jaj2 − 35 jbj2 + 25 jcj2 + 35 jdj2 > 0 (20)
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respectively. These inequalities are satised, for example, for jaj2 = 116, jbj2 =
18, jcj2 = 916, jdj2 = 14. Hence from eq. (2)
$A(1, 1) = −25 jaj2 + 15 jbj2 + 50 jcj2 = 45516
$A(p, 1) = (−25 jaj2 + 25 jdj2 + 35 jcj2 − 35 jbj2)p+
(−25 jdj2 + 50 jbj2 + 15 jcj2) = 13516 + 20p
$B(1, 1) = −25 jaj2 + 50 jdj2 + 15 jbj2 = 20516
$B(1, q) = (−25 jaj2 + 35 jdj2 − 35 jbj2 + 25 jcj2)q+
15 jdj2 + 50 jbj2 − 25 jcj2 = 27016q − 6516
From these equations it is clear that $A(1, 1) > $A(p, 1) 8 0 < p < 1 and
$B(1, 1) > $B(1, q) 8 0 < q < 1. As strict inequality holds in this case, therefore,
p = q = 1 is an ESS.
2.2.3 Case 3 (mixed ESS)
For asymmetric case and from inequalities (2.2), (2.2) we have
p = −7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 7 jcj2 + 5 jdj2 12(− jaj2 − jbj2 + jcj2 + jdj2), q = −7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 5 jcj2 + 7 jdj2 12(− ja
Strict inequality does not hold for these values, therefore
p = −7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 7 jcj2 + 5 jdj2 12(− jaj2 − jbj2 + jcj2 + jdj2), q = −7 jaj2 − 5 jbj2 + 5 jcj2 + 7 jdj2 12(− jaj2 −
is not an ESS.
3 Conclusion
We showed that there exists pure ESS in quantum version of the Hawk-Dove
game whereas no such pure ESS can exist in classical version of this game. We
found that in quantum two players symmetric Hawk-Dove game an additional
restriction on parameters of initial quantum state is needed. We considered the
game in both symmetric and asymmetric situations and showed that pure ESS
can exist in both whereas mixed ESS only in symmetric situation.
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